Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 21

Issue 4

Article 3

2016

Secure Two-Party Distance Computation Protocol Based on
Privacy Homomorphism and Scalar Product in Wireless Sensor
Networks
Haiping Huang
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Jiangsu High Technology Research Key Laboratory
for Wireless Sensor Networks, Nanjing 210003, China.

Tianhe Gong
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Jiangsu High Technology Research Key Laboratory
for Wireless Sensor Networks, Nanjing 210003, China.

Ping Chen
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Jiangsu High Technology Research Key Laboratory
for Wireless Sensor Networks, Nanjing 210003, China.

Reza Malekian
Department of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, University of Pretoria, Hatfield 0028, South
Africa.

Tao Chen
Nanjingthis
University
of Postsworks
and Telecommunications,
Jiangsu High Technology Research Key Laboratory
Follow
and additional
at: https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghuafor
Wireless
Sensor
Networks,
Nanjing
210003,
China.
science-and-technology
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Haiping Huang, Tianhe Gong, Ping Chen et al. Secure Two-Party Distance Computation Protocol Based on
Privacy Homomorphism and Scalar Product in Wireless Sensor Networks. Tsinghua Science and
Technology 2016, 21(4): 385-396.

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tsinghua Science and Technology by an authorized editor of Tsinghua
University Press: Journals Publishing.

TSINGHUA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ISSNll1007-0214ll03/11llpp385–396
Volume 21, Number 4, August 2016

Secure Two-Party Distance Computation Protocol Based on Privacy
Homomorphism and Scalar Product in Wireless Sensor Networks
Haiping Huang , Tianhe Gong, Ping Chen, Reza Malekian, and Tao Chen
Abstract: Numerous privacy-preserving issues have emerged along with the fast development of the Internet
of Things. In addressing privacy protection problems in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), secure multi-party
computation is considered vital, where obtaining the Euclidian distance between two nodes with no disclosure
of either side’s secrets has become the focus of location-privacy-related applications. This paper proposes a
novel Privacy-Preserving Scalar Product Protocol (PPSPP) for wireless sensor networks. Based on PPSPP, we
then propose a Homomorphic-Encryption-based Euclidean Distance Protocol (HEEDP) without third parties. This
protocol can achieve secure distance computation between two sensor nodes. Correctness proofs of PPSPP
and HEEDP are provided, followed by security validation and analysis. Performance evaluations via comparisons
among similar protocols demonstrate that HEEDP is superior; it is most efficient in terms of both communication
and computation on a wide range of data types, especially in wireless sensor networks.
Key words: secure two-party computation; privacy-preserving; wireless sensor networks; scalar product; distance
calculation; privacy homomorphism

1
1.1

Introduction
Problem statement

In open ad hoc networks, including wireless sensor
networks, the privacy of location information is usually
considered as important to maintain[1] , and is an
important target for adversaries. For example, in
military wireless sensor networks, how to protect
private data of nodes, especially the location of vital
nodes, has become a research hotspot: The concern is
that enemies might obtain military secrets that would
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grant them a battle advantage through localization.
Another research motivation comes from drivers in
automotive traffic. They would like their location to
remain private to avoid push notifications from locationbased service providers who can obtain their positions
through many types of sensors. Both the military and
the traffic applications may be viewed as problems
of privacy protection in wireless sensor networks.
Current research on location-privacy preservation issues
in WSN focuses on routing-level privacy problems,
and proposes ways to protect the source-location
information of delivered messages from being picked
up by adversaries who fake message routing[2] . Most
solutions, however, do not involve protecting datalevel location privacy, frequently require excessive
encryption and decryption operations or a trusted third
party, and impose computational overhead and network
costs unsuitable for WSN with their limited energy and
computation capability.
Achieving data transfer related to position between
two sensor nodes without revealing their respective
location information has therefore become a sensitive
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issue in WSN. For instance, a sensor node on one
armored vehicle wants to calculate the distance between
another armored vehicle and itself, but does not want
to publish location information on wireless channels.
This is a typical issue in secure two-party distance
computation in WSN environments; this paper will
focus on it by means of privacy homomorphism,
rather than traditional secure measurements such as
authentications or authorizations.
With the development of the privacy protection
technologies required for the Internet of Things,
secure multi-party computation, derived from Yao’s
“millionaires problem”[3] , has been widely used[4] .
1.2

Proposed approaches

This paper focuses on secure two-party distance
computation based on a privacy homomorphism
strategy, which is an important branch of the
field of Privacy-Preserving Computational Geometry
(PPCG)[5] . Two-party protocols are the foundation for
multi-party protocols.
Secure two-party privacy distance calculation
protocols used in WSN can be described as follows.
Suppose there are two sensor nodes, A and B, involved
in this protocol. Node A has one private vector (an
n-dimensional point vector) P D .x1 ; x2 ; :::; xn /. Node
B holds another private vector (an n-dimensional point
vector) Q D .y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn /. Two participants take their
own secret vectors as inputs to the protocol and will
achieve the final result through cooperation calculations
without disclosing their respective privacy, i.e., both
A and B know nothing about the other side’s inputs,
but obtain the distance between them. We discuss the
Euclidean distance (denoted as d (2)) calculated in
Eq. (1).
v
!
u n
u X
jxi yi j2
(1)
d.2/ D t
i D0

Currently,
most secure two-party distance
computation protocols are realized based on secure
scalar product protocols[6] , which frequently appear in
such applications as location privacy protection, secure
seeking for nearest-neighbor, safety search for spatial
range, and private data mining. However, most current
protocols cannot achieve satisfactory performance, or
have defects such as only supporting a single data type.
In response, the design of secure, effective, and novel
protocols for WSN is the focus of this paper.
In this study, a semi-honest model is adopted,

and two well-designed protocols based on privacy
homomorphism and scalar product are proposed, which
are distinguished from prevalent solutions, especially
in secure multi-party computation, and would be
applied in wireless sensor networks. A “calculation
of indiscernibility” method is employed to demonstrate
the security. Computational and communicational
complexity, network delay, and availability are
compared with those of previous works and are shown
to be better.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we formalize the semi-honest model
and homomorphic encryption mechanism. We then
present a novel secure two-party scalar product scheme,
based on which we propose a secure two-party
distance computation protocol in Section 3. The
security analysis and communication and computation
performance evaluation are outlined in Section 4. We
review related works in Section 5. We describe our
conclusions in Section 6.

2
2.1

Computation Model
Semi-honest model

In this paper, we make use of a semi-honest model[6]
in our two-party computation protocol, where two
participants and other parties (for instance, a WSN base
station) faithfully carry out protocols. In doing so they
provide their real data for calculations without causing
intentional errors such as deliberately interrupting the
execution of protocols. They save all of the intermediate
information obtained in the calculation process and the
final result, try to deduce the other side’s secrets from
this information, and breach the privacy of both sides.
A semi-honest participant is also called “honest but
curious”. Generally, the “semi-honest” secure two-party
computation model can be described as follows, which
will be used in the security proof of the protocols.
There exists a mapping function f W f0; 1g f0; 1g
7! f0; 1g  f0; 1g ; where f1 (x, y) is the first
element. And  denotes a secure two-party
computation protocol. During the implementation
of , the view of the first party view1 .x; y/ is
represented by .x; r 1 ; m11 ; m12 ; :::; m1t / (analogously
.y; r 2 ; m21 ; m22 ; :::; m2t / denotes the view of the second
party view2 .x; y/), where x is the input, r 1 denotes
the result of random coin toss, and m1i stands for
the i -th intermediate message received by the first
party. When  is completed, the output of the first
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party is marked as output1 .x; y/ (the output of the
second party is output2 .x; y/), and the output of  is
output .x; y/ D .output1 .x; y/; output2 .x; y//.
Generally, if there exists a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm (denoted by S1 or S2 ) to execute the
privacy computation of f , we can conclude that
f.S1 .x; f1 .x; y/; f2 .x; y///gx;y 
f.view1 .x; y/; output2 .x; y//gx;y

(2)

f.f1 .x; y/; S2 .x; f2 .x; y///gx;y 
f.output1 .x; y//; view2 .x; y/gx;y

(3)

where the meaning of “” is “calculation of
indiscernibility”, outputi .x; y/ is entirely determined
by viewi .x; y/, and both are stochastic variables. We
call S1 or S2 as time-simulator.
2.2

Homomorphism encryption model

The Homomorphic Encryption Scheme (HES) is a
common public-key system used in secure multi-party
computation, whose encryption and decryption are
denoted by E./ and D./. One type of encrypted
operation on plain-text is marked with “˚”, and can be
equivalent to another operation (denoted “˝”) on the
cipher-text, as shown in Eq. (4).
E.x/ ˝ E.y/ D E.x ˚ y/

(4)

There are two kinds of encryption forms: one
is Multiplicative Homomorphism as in Eq. (5), and
ElGamal Encryption Algorithm[7] is its specific case;
another, that satisfies Eq. (6), is named Additive
Homomorphism, such as the famous Paillier Encryption
Algorithm[8] .
E.x/ ˝ E.y/ D E.x  y/

(5)

E.x/ ˝ E.y/ D E.x C y/

(6)

Similarly, we can deduce the form of exponential
encryption calculation in terms of Eq. (7).
E.nx/ D E.x/n

3
3.1

(7)

Protocol Description
Secure scalar-product protocol based on
privacy homomorphism

In this section, a novel Privacy-Preserving Scalar
Product Protocol (PPSPP) based on homomorphic
encryption is proposed for WSN. We describe a scalar
product problem as follows: Node A owns a secret
vector P and Node B holds another, Q; they will
securely calculate the result of P  Q, where the
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two participants can deduce nothing of the other side
from the result or any intermediate information. The
execution of the protocol is divided into four phases:
input phase, calculation phase, output phase, and
correctness proof phase. Node A and Node B are semihonest participants in the procedure.
(1) Input phase
Node A selects a private vector PD .x1 ; x2 ; :::; xn /
as its input, and Node B chooses another QD
.y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn / and keeps it secret.
(2) Output phase
The result of protocol implementation is the scalar
product of P and Q, shown as Eq. (8). We also use
f .P, Q/ to represent the final result shared by the
two participants, which satisfies Eq. (9), where Node
A holds the value of fA and Node B controls that of
fB . Finally, Node A reveals fA and Node B declares
fB publicly so that they can obtain the result f .P, Q/
according to Eq. (9).
n
X
PQD
xi yi
(8)
i D0

fB D f .P; Q/ C fA

(9)

(3) Calculation phase
Step 1: Node A generates a random vector Ra D
.ra1 ; ra2 ; :::; ran /, and for each rai (i D 1; 2; :::; n),
makes xi0 (xi0 D rai C xi ) a positive integer. To
protect secret data, two vectors P1 and Q1 are defined
and kept by Nodes A and B, respectively. Node A
calculates P1 in terms of Eq. (10). Subsequently,
Node A creates a pair of keys .E; D/, where E./
denotes homomorphic encryption and D./ represents
homomorphic decryption. Node A uses E./ to encrypt
P1 and executes Eq. (11), and sends E.P1 / together
with Ra and E./ to Node B.
P1 D P C Ra D .x10 ; x20 ; :::; xn0 / D
.ra1 C x1 ; ra2 C x2 ; :::; ran C xn /

(10)

E.P1 / D .E.ra1 C x1 /; E.ra2 C x2 /; :::; E.ran C xn //
(11)
Step 2: After Node B receives E.P1 /, Ra
and E, it generates a vector Rb D .rb1 ; rb2 ; :::; rbn /
stochastically, and for each rbi (i D 1; 2; :::; n), makes
yi0 (yi0 D rbi C yi ) a positive integer. Node B obtains
Q1 according to Eq. (12), followed by selecting a
random number v, and calculating s1 and s2 based on
homonorphic encryption, shown as Eqs. (13) and (14).
Then Node B sends Rb, s1 , and s2 to Node A.
Q1 D QCRb D .rb1 Cy1 ; rb2 Cy2 ; :::; rbn Cyn / (12)
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n
Y

s1 D E.v/

0

E.xi0 /yi

(13)

i D1

s2 D

n
X

rai yi0

(14)

i D1

Step 3: Node A decrypts s1 and calculates u on the
basis of Eq. (15) so that it can share the scalar product
result P  Q with Node B in accordance with Eq. (16),
where fA D u, fB D v, f .P; Q/ D PQ, satisfying
the form of Eq. (9).
u D D.s1 /

s2

P  Rb

(15)

uDPQCv

(16)

(4) Correctness proof phase
Proof: we can substitute the detailed expressions
from Eqs. (10), (12) – (14) for variables xi , yi , s1 , and
s2 in Eq. (15), and thus obtain Eq. (17),
u DD.s1 / s2 P  Rb D
D.E.v/
D.E.v/

n
Y
i D1
n
Y

0
E.xi0 /yi /

n
X

rai yi0

i D1
yi Crbi

E.xi C rai /

n
X

v 0 D 2v C

i D1
2

u0 D jPQj

rai .yi C rbi /

n
X

v0

(20)
n
X

xi yi in

Section 3.1, so we can deduce Eq. (21) by expanding
Eq. (18). Then in terms of Eq. (19), we substitute v 0
n
X
yi2 for “2v” in Eq. (21), and we obtain Eq. (22)

xi rbi D

i D1

where fA D u0 , fB D v 0 , and f .P; Q/ D jPQj2 ,
satisfying the form of Eq. (9). The correctness proof is
thus completed.
n
X
u0 D 2u C
xi2 D

i D1

rai .yi C rbi /

n
X

xi rbi D

i D1

xi yi C v

(17)

i D1
n
X

i D1
n
X

2.v C
xi yi .

We conclude that Eq.

n
X

iD1

(15) is equivalent with Eq. (16), both of which are in
keeping with the form of Eq. (9). The correctness proof
is thereby completed.
3.2

(19)

Proof: we proved the equality u D v C

/

i D1

where P  Q D

yi2

(2) Correctness proof phase

i D1

n
X
vC
.xi C rai /.yi C rbi /

i D1
n
X

n
X

i D1

i D1

n
X

i D1

xi rbi D

i D1
n
X

proof, where the input and output phases of HEEDP
are the same as those of PPSPP, except for substituting
the distance square jPQj2 for the scalar product result
P  Q in the output phase. We therefore only describe
the latter two phases.
(1) Calculation phase
Step 1: Node A and Node B jointly execute the
calculation phase of PPSPP; Node A gets u, and Node
B retains v.
Step 2: Node A calculates u0 according to Eq. (18),
and Node B gains v 0 in terms of Eq. (19) so that they
can share the distance result jPQj2 in accordance with
Eq. (20), where fA D u0 , fB D v 0 , f .P; Q/ D jPQj2 ,
satisfying the form of Eq. (9).
n
X
u0 D 2u C
xi2
(18)

Secure two-party distance computation
protocol based on scalar product

A novel Homomorphic Encryption-based Euclidean
Distance Protocol (HEEDP) with no third parties is put
forward in this section, where we make use of PPSPP
introduced in Section 3.1 to complete the scalar product
calculation. Four phases are involved in this protocol,
including input, output, calculation, and correctness

xi2

i D1
n
X

2

i D1

u0 D

n
X
i D1
n
X

xi2
xi2

i D1
n
X
i D1
n
X

2

n
X
i D1
n
X

.xi

yi /2

n
X

xi2 D

i D1

xi yi

2v

(21)

iD1

xi yi

2v D

xi yi

2v C

i D1

.xi

i D1

2

xi yi / C

n
X

yi2

iD1

.2v C

n
X

n
X

yi2 D

i D1

yi2 / D

i D1

yi /2

v0

(22)
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4

Performance Evaluation

The security evaluation and efficiency analysis of
PPSPP and HEEDP will be illustrated in this section.
4.1

Security proof

Theorem 1: In PPSPP, Node A and Node B cannot get
each other’s secret input.
Proof: This protocol assumes that Node A and Node
B are semi-honest participants, and they only share the
result P  Q; they cannot get each other’s private vector.
The security analysis of vital steps of PPSPP follows.
(1) In the input phase, both Node A and Node
B take data disguises for their respective private
vectors P and Q with Ra D .ra1 ; ra2 ; :::; ran / and
Rb D .rb1 ; rb2 ; :::; rbn /. Elements in both P and Q are
integers, which is convenient for hiding real data.
(2) In Step 1 of the calculation phase, Node A
encrypts P1 , and sends E.P1 /, Ra, and E./ to Node
B. However, Node B cannot decrypt E.P1 /, so Node B
cannot deduce those elements in vector P.
(3) In Step 2 of the calculation phase, Node
n
X
B calculates E.v C
xi0 yi0 / according to additive
i D1

homomorphic encryption, where Node B uses a
random number v to realize data disguises. For
example, yi is confused by rbi , so even if n D 1,
Node A cannot acquire y1 from equations s2 D ra1
and y10 D ra1 .rb1 C y1 /. Node A cannot get any
information about Node B’s secret vector Q only from
Node A’s intermediate data s1 and s2 .
In summary, no information is revealed in any step
of the PPSPP protocol in order to ensure the privacy of
Node A and Node B.
Theorem 2: PPSPP (denoted by ) is privacypreserving during the calculation of the scalar product.
Proof: Because only two parties are involved in the
calculation, and they are semi-honest participants, the
proof can be simplified to “one party tries to deduce the
other party’s private data in terms of its own input as
well as all the intermediate information and the final
output”. If the final output shared by Node A and
Node B is the same as that deduced from the ideal
model, we just need to prove that all of the intermediate
information gained by the attacker who forces one
party to implement PPSPP correctly, is “calculation
of indiscernibility” as the information generated in the
ideal environment.
The attacker will construct a simulator S1 , which
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will simulate all the intermediate information during
the execution of PPSPP. We can discretionarily decide
Node A (or Node B) is captured by the attacker so that
the simulator S1 is used to simulate the view of Node
A: view1 .P D .x1 ; x2 ; :::; xn /; Q D .y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn //.
Thus this proved process is transformed into verifying
that fS1 .P; f1 .P; Q/; f2 .P; Q//g and fview1 .P; Q/;
output2 .P; Q/g are “calculation of indiscernibility”,
where view1 .P; Q/ D .P; r 1 ; m11 ; m12 ; :::; m1t /. The
input of Node A, i.e., P D .x1 ; x2 ; :::; xn /, and the final
scalar product result P  Q are regarded as the inputs of
S1 .
(1) Input phase of PPSPP
The attacker captures Node A and notifies S1 , and
acquires all of A’s data including its secret input P and
the final calculation result PQ. Node A knows nothing
about Node B’s private vector Q, which just appears a
series of random bits for others. So S1 has to select
a simulative vector Q0 D .y1s ; y2s ; :::; yns / according to
.P; P  Q/ and Eq. (8), where yis is the replacement
n
X
value for yi , which also satisfies P  Q D
xi yis .
i D1

(2) Calculation phase of PPSPP
In Step 1, Node A generates a random vector
Ra D .ra1 ; ra2 ; :::; ran / and a pair of keys .E; D/ for
homonorphic encryption, and A gets P1 and E.P1 / in
terms of Eqs. (10) and (11), respectively. However,
S1 will select another simulated random vector Ra0 D
.ra01 ; ra02 ; :::; ra0n /, and according to Eq. (10), S1 will
obtain P01 D P C Ra0 D .x100 ; x200 ; :::; xn00 / D .ra01 C
x1 ; ra02 C x2 ; :::; ra0n C xn / and E.P01 / (the result of
encryption of P01 ). Thus the attacker obtains all of Node
A’s information in Step 1.
In Step 2, owing to the absence of Node B’s random
vector Rb and random number v, S1 can only calculate
n
n
Y
X
s0
S10 D E.v 0 /
E.xi0 /yi and S20 D
rai yis 0 in light
i D1

i D1

of Eqs. (12) – (15), where Rb0 D .rb01 ; rb02 ; :::; rb0n / and
v 0 are imaginary data from S1 , which creates them
by means of a stochastic coin toss by Node A. So S1
simulates all the intermediate data of Node B in Step 2.
In Step 3, S1 acquires u0 D D.s10 / s20 P*Rb0 .
(3) Output phase of PPSPP
These simulated data such as u0 , v 0 , Q0 D .y1s ; y2s ;
:::; yns / also satisfy the form of Eq. (9), i.e., f .P; Q/0 D
f .P; Q/ C fA0 , where fA0 D u0 , fB0 D v 0 . After
two participants exchange their respective information,
both of them obtain fA0 and fB0 so that they can
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derive f .P; Q/. Here S1 simulates all of Node A’s data
ffA0 ; fB0 ; f .P; Q/g.
In above Steps 1 to 3, all information handled by the
attacker is not computationally distinguished from that
obtained in the normal execution of PPSPP. Because
S1 .P; P  Q/ D fP; r1 ; s10 ; s20 ; P  Qg, the view of Node
A is view1 .P; Q/ D fP; r 1 ; s1 ; s2 g, and the reasonable
output of PPSPP is output1 .P; Q/ D output2 .P; Q/ D
P  Q, we can obtain fS1 .P; P  Q/; P  Qg 
fview1 .P; Q/; output2 .P; Q/g.
Likewise, if an attacker suborns Node B, he
will gather all information of Node B by creating
another simulator S2 . The view of Node B is
view2 .P D .x1 ; x2 ; :::; xn /; Q D .y1 ; y2 ; :::; yn //, and
we are also able to obtain the same results: ff1 .P; Q/;
S2 .Q; f2 .P; Q//g and foutput1 .P; Q/; view2 .P; Q/g are
thus a “calculation of indiscernibility”.
Theorem 3: HEEDP is privacy-preserving during
the calculation of distance, where Node A and Node B
cannot get each other’s secret input.
Proof: (1) In HEEDP, Node A and Node B exchange
their respective information when and only when they
jointly execute PPSPP; (2) Through Theorems 1 and
2, PPSPP has been proven secure. So Theorem 3 is
thereby proven as well.
4.2

Efficiency analysis

In this section, the communication round complexity,
computational complexity, and computational data
type of HEEDP and other similar protocols will
be discussed. For the convenience of comparison
with HEEDP, we choose protocols based on the
privacy homomorphism technique, including those
documented in Refs. [4, 9–12]. Reference [4] only
provides a secure two-party scalar product protocol,
which can be supposed to be used in secure
distance calculations, called “Lu’s protocol”. The
protocol in Ref. [9] is named the “Amirbekyan
Table 1

HEEDP protocol
based on PPSPP
Lu’s protocol[4]
Amirbekyan’s protocol[9]
Luo’s protocol[10]
Zhong’s protocol[11]
Rane’s protocol[12]

protocol”. Similarly, the solutions in Refs. [10–
12] are called “Luo’s protocol”, “Zhong’s protocol”,
and “Rane’s protocol”, respectively. Because most
of the safe distance calculation protocols are based
on the Paillier encryption scheme, in order to
facilitate comparisons, HEEDP also utilizes the Paillier
scheme. The comparison details are displayed in
Table 1.
4.2.1

Communication round complexity

In HEEDP, Node A and Node B communicate with each
other twice from Step 1 to Step 2, so the communication
round complexity is 2. In addition to Lu’s protocol
and Rane’s protocol, whose communication cost is
proportional to original vector dimension n, others have
achieved satisfactory communication efficiency.
4.2.2

Computational complexity

We ignore the computational cost of creating random
numbers and the key pair for homomorphic encryption,
which can be completed in the preprocessing stage;
only the calculation phase is considered, whose primary
computational cost relies on vectors’ dimensions and
the complexity of homomorphic encryption. In PPSPP,
in order to calculate a scalar product with n dimensions,
Node A needs to carry out n encryptions, i.e., E.P1 / D
.E.ra1 C x1 /; E.ra2 C x2 /; :::; E.ran C xn //, in Step
1, Node B has to take one encryption, n modular
multiplications, and n modular exponentiations, i.e.,
n
Y
0
s1 D E.v/
E.xi0 /yi , in Step 2. In Step 3, Node
i D1

A completes one decryption, i.e., u D D.s1 / s2
P  Rb. So the computational cost of HEEDP based
on PPSPP includes .n C 1/ encryptions, n modular
exponentiations, n modular multiplications, and one
decryption. We have agreed that if one protocol uses the
Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme, which needs
2logN modular multiplications (the modular operator
is N 2 ) for each encryption or decryption, and 2d

Efficiency comparisons between HEEDP and other protocols.
Computational
Computational
Data type
complexity for
complexity for
2-dimensional vector 3-dimensional vector

Communication
round
complexity

Computational complexity

2

.2n C 4/logN C 2nd C n

8logN C 4d C 2

10logN C 6d C 3

Real

n
2
2
2
n

.6nC2/logN C.2nC2/d Cn
6nlogN C n
6nlogN C 2nd C n
.2n C 4/logN C 2nd C n
.2nC2/logN C2nd CnC1

14logN C 6d C 2
12logN C 2
12logN C 4d C 2
—
6logN C 4d C 3

20logN C 8d C 3
18logN C 3
18logN C 6d C 3
10logN C 6d C 3
8logN C 6d C 4

Real
Integer
Real
Integer
Real

Haiping Huang et al.: Secure Two-Party Distance Computation Protocol Based on Privacy Homomorphism : : :

modular multiplications at most (the modular operator
is N 2 ) for each modular exponentiation, where d
indicates the number of bits of processed data. So the
computational complexity of HEEDP can be specified
as .2n C 4/logN C 2nd C n modular multiplications
(the modular operator is N 2 ).
Lu’s protocol has higher computational complexity
than other protocols: .6n C 2/logN C .2n C 2/d C n.
Amirbekyan’s protocol, without consideration of the
computational expense of the permutation replacement,
needs 2n encryptions, n modular multiplications, and
n decryptions, a total of 6nlogN C n by using the
Paillier homomorphic scheme. Since no modular
exponentiations appear in Amirbekyan’s protocol, it
achieves low complexity but cannot deal with the
situation where n D 1. The computational complexity
of Luo’s protocol is obviously higher than that of
HEEDP, with a cost of 6nlogN C 2nd C n. Though
Zhong’s protocol[11] has the same computational
complexity as HEEDP, it does not take the case of
“n < 3” into account. Even with an unsatisfactory
communication round cost, the computation complexity
of Rane’s protocol is just .2n C 2/logN C 2nd C n C 1
times modular multiplication (modular operator N 2 ).
4.2.3

Computational data type

The disadvantage of Amirbekyan’s protocol and
Zhong’s protocol is due to limitations within the integer
range produced by direct encryption of private vectors
without data disguises, while the data type of HEEDP
and other protocols can be expanded to the real range.
As seen in Table 1, HEEDP is a comprehensive
protocol, with the best communication round
complexity, satisfactory computational complexity,
and a broad calculation range for real numbers.
4.2.4

Availability in wireless sensor networks

To achieve data-level privacy protection in the third
scenario, Nodes A and B must encrypt their locations
separately using the public key of the base station, and
the base station must decrypt them and calculate the
distance between Nodes A and B; then the base station
must encrypt the distance value by the public keys and
send it to A and B. Finally, Nodes A and B decrypt it and
obtain the result. If Nodes A and B cannot communicate
with the base station within one hop, this method will
cause heavy network loads.
In order to ensure the validity of comparisons, we
make some assumptions about the three scenarios. As
shown in Fig. 1, a distance calculation group would
consist of any two nodes in the network. Once a
node joins a group it cannot join other groups, unless
its partner “dies”. If this happens, the node can find
another single node with which to form a new group. In
our simulation experiments, nodes prefer nearby nodes
with which to form a group. All groups repeatedly
calculate the distance between the two members, until
the network life-cycle concludes. The base station does
not participate in any group, and all packets are the same
size which is divisible by 16. The Leach protocol is used
for clustering and routing, to ensure path accessibility.
Detailed simulation parameters are shown in Table 2.
We set two cases, “n D 3, d D 64 bit” and “n D 8;
d D 96 bit”, to reflect the trend of network lifetimes,
based on the comparisons of HEEDP and ECC, seen
in Figs. 2a and 2b. We note that with the increase
in sensor nodes, the network lifetime of both HEEDP
and ECC appears to decline after an initial growth.
There are different reasons for these phenomena for
HEEDP and ECC. There still exist some active sensor
nodes in HEEDP because they cannot find another
neighbor in their communication ranges when the
number of nodes is 100; however, the lifecycle is

ECC

No secure strategies

P
ED

HE

P
ED
HE

4.2.4.1 Network lifetime analysis
It is necessary to verify the availability of HEEDP
in wireless sensor networks. We design simulation
experiments related to distance to observe changes
in network lifetime and energy consumption in the
following three scenarios: calculating the distance
between Nodes A and B which directly exchange their
location information without a secure strategy; using
HEEDP to do the distance calculation; and realizing
the computation through encryption, decryption, and a
reliable third party (the base station) based on Elliptic
Curves Cryptography (ECC), which is considered
the most lightweight public key method in WSN.
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Base station

ECC
The first scenario

Fig. 1

The third scenario

The second scenario

Three simulation scenarios.
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Table 2

Simulation parameters settings.

Parameters

Distribution of sensor nodes

Clustering and routing protocol
The number of dimensions of
location information
Original energy of node

Setting value
Uniform distribution of
from 100 to 400 nodes,
with the base station is
in the center
Leach
n D 3, n D 8,
and n D 12
20 J (infinite energy
for the base station)

Energy consumption when sending
0.35 J
a packet (at most d D 128 bit)
Energy consumption when receiving
0.15 J
a packet (at most d D 128 bit)
Energy consumption when processing
0.0005 J
a packet (at most d D 128 bit)
Energy consumption when encrypting
0.0005 J
or decrypting one bit with ECC
(at most d D 128 bit)
Energy consumption when processing
0.001 J
a modular multiplication (modular
2
operator N ) (at most d D 128 bit)
Communication radius of node
50 m
modular operator N 2
N D 79, N 2 D 6241

Network lifetime (s)

1500

HEEDP
ECC

1200
900
600
300
0
100

150

200
250
300
Number of sensor nodes

350

400

(a) n = 3, d = 64 bit

Network lifetime (s)

1000

HEEDP
ECC

800
600
400
200
0
100

150

200
250
300
Number of sensor nodes

350

400

station for each node in the network, the secure distance
calculation based on ECC would lead to more energy
consumption, compared with HEEDP. Similarly, if 100
nodes are uniformly distributed in a 400  400 field,
at last some active nodes cannot establish a path to the
base station before the lifecycle ends. Enhancement of
sensor nodes could create more paths to the base station,
which could prolong the network lifetime. However,
when the number of nodes is 250 or more, many
nodes will play the role of relay to achieve more paths,
which will cause the shortening of the lifecycle due
to greater energy consumption. It is worthy of notice
that parameters n and d have more influence on the
lifetime of HEEDP, which in Fig. 2b is less than that
shown in Fig. 2a; and the larger n and d , the greater the
computation cost of HEEDP. However, the increase of
the values of n and d has little effect on the decline of
ECC, even though it increases computational overhead.
Figure 3 shows comparisons of average remainder
energy of three scenarios which have completed threequarters of their respective lifetimes by executing their
protocols, where the value of n is 12. The unsafe
scenario obtains the best efficiency, and the scenario
based on HEEDP also achieves more satisfactory
performance than that of ECC when d < 96 bit.
However, with the continuous increase of the value
d , the scenario based on HEEDP would consume a
little more energy than that of ECC, whose defect
is in its energy consumption, caused by abundant
communication frequencies once the value of d > 0.
Generally, the value n is less than 3 and the bits
of location data in a sensor node are fewer than 128,
though the increase of location dimensions n and bit
number d would bring heavy network overhead for
HEEDP, as seen in Figs. 2 and 3.
4.2.4.2 Data processing delay analysis
Data processing delay may cause serious backlogs of
packets in sensor nodes, so it should be taken into

Fig. 2 Comparisons of network lifetime between HEEDP
and ECC.

terminated. With an increase in sensor nodes, these
symptoms are relieved, for instance, if the number
of nodes is 150 or 200. With more nodes (350 or
400), more and more new groups emerge while some
previous groups are still running, which causes more
communication costs, shortening the lifecycle. Owing
to direct or multi-hop communication with the base

Average remainder energy of nodes (J)

(b) n =8, d = 96 bit
ECC
HEEDP
Unsafe
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
100

150

200
Numb 250
er o f no 300
des

350

400 0

20

120
100
80
d, bit)
60
value of
40
et (the
ck
pa
Size of

140

Fig. 3 Comparison of average remainder energy among
three scenarios.
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consideration in order to prolong the network lifetime
and guarantee Quality of Service (QoS), especially in
real-time location-related scenarios such as intelligent
traffic guidance. One of the most important impact
factors is the speed of data encryption or decryption,
which implies that encryption algorithms should be
as efficient as possible. For the purpose of analysis
and comparisons of data processing delays, simulation
experiments on RSA, ECC, and HEEDP are conducted,
and the total time consumed by the three methods is
recorded. The reason RSA and ECC are chosen is that
RSA is one of the most influential public encryption
algorithms, and ECC is considered one of the most
lightweight public key algorithms in WSN. To quantify
these experiments,  vectors are encrypted at one time,
where each vector contains n elements.
In the first experiment,  is fixed at 100, and n
changes from 1 to 10. The result can be seen in Fig.
4a. Meanwhile, the second experiment fixes n at 10 and
 varies from 0 to 200, as shown in Fig. 4b.
It can be seen that HEEDP has the most satisfactory
performance among these three algorithms. This is
1800
RSA
ECC
HEEDP

Data processing time (ms)

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1

2

3

4

5
6
Value of n

7

8

9

10

(a)
3500

Data processing time (ms)

3000

RSA
ECC
HEEDP

2500
2000
1500
1000
500

0

50

100
Number of vectors, ρ

150

200

(b)

Fig. 4 Comparisons of data processing delay among RSA,
ECC, and HEEDP.
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because no power operations are involved in data
processing. Although ECC is considered a lightweight
algorithm, it consumes much time because of
scalar multiplications and quadratic residue judgments.
Moreover, both RSA and ECC consume lots of
storage for sensor nodes, which further increases data
processing delay.

5

Related Work

In location privacy applications, the location
information is usually represented as a multidimensional vector, for example, two- or threedimensional coordinates. A scalar product protocol
is exactly suitable for multi-dimensional vector
operations, so it becomes the basis of most secure
distance calculation protocols. Scalar product protocols
can be generally divided into two categories: one
is based on a semi-honest third party, and the other
achieves the correct result by the two parties without
any aid from other parties. Many of these have
been proposed, with different security levels and
computational complexities[4, 9, 10, 13–15] .
Protocols in Refs. [13, 14] use a semi-honest third
party. Reference [13] proposes a scalar product protocol
whose communication complexity is 4n (n denotes
the number of dimensions of the original input), with
four times the cost of Distributed Non-Private Setting
(DNPS) that is considered the standard cost of a
two-party scalar product protocol without any privacy
calculations. Reference [14] presents a secure twoparty quantum scalar product scheme via quantum
entanglement and quantum measurement with the help
of a non-colluding third party; this scheme is proven
to be secure under various outside and inside attacks.
However, the third-party involvement incurs extra
overhead, and in many temporary-building or poorlink-quality wireless networks, it is difficult to find a
permanent trusted third party.
At the same time, other scalar product protocols
without a third party are being constantly proposed,
where the most representative one is based on privacy
homomorphism, such as protocols in Refs. [4, 9, 10].
In intelligent medical treatment applications, to achieve
the tradeoff between the privacy disclosure and the high
reliability of personal health information in healthcare
emergency, Ref. [4] introduces an efficient user-centric
privacy access control method, which is based on
attribute-based access control and a new privacypreserving scalar product computation technique, and
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allows a medical user to decide who can participate
in the opportunistic computing to assist in processing
his personal health information. Amirbekyan’s protocol
in Ref. [9] is based on the permutation replacement
method, and makes use of privacy homomorphism
and data confusion to achieve privacy protection. Luo
et al.[10] suggested a homomorphic scalar product
scheme and expanded it into a secure two-party distance
calculation. However, the computational complexity
of these protocols is higher than that of most thirdparty protocols. Their main computational cost is
derived from homomorphic encryption operations, for
example, the computational complexity of the proposed
schemes in Refs. [4, 9, 10] is O.n3 /. Based on the
data conversion technique, Ref. [15] puts forward a
protocol with a smaller computational cost of O.n2 /,
but attended by different degrees of privacy information
leakage, especially when the vector dimension is small
or some parameters are given special values.
Secure scalar-product-based two-party distance
computation
protocols
are
of
widespread
[10–12, 16, 17]
interest
. In the early research stages,
assuming the existence of a third party is the design
principal of two-party distance calculation. Through
a third party, two participants attempt to obtain
the distance value with no leakage of private data.
The proposal in Ref. [11] describes a safe distance
calculation solution aimed at two-dimensional vectors,
containing an oblivious third party. However, as
mentioned above, finding a reliable third party is
difficult, and it may also become a security bottleneck.
So secure two-party distance calculation protocols
without a third party are paid more attention, such
as the aforementioned studies[10, 12, 16, 17] . Reference
[12] describes and analyzes a privacy-preserving
approximation protocol for the L1 distance that keeps
the computation overhead manageable by performing
a Johnson-Lindenstrauss embedding into L2 space,
and performing a secure two-party computation of
L2 distance using Paillier homomorphism encryption.
Similarly based on privacy homomorphism, Reference
[16] gives an effective solution to some specific
geometric problems, such as the distance between two
private points.
Many researchers have designed safe protocols
related to location privacy to apply in WSN. Reference
[17] adopts traditional secure methods with greater
network cost, and discusses the key concepts in source
location privacy, such as anonymity, unobservability,
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etc. Then, it presents an overview of the solutions
that provide source location privacy within a WSN,
in relation to assumptions about the adversarys
capabilities. Reference [18] proposes a Location
Privacy Routing (LPR) protocol that is easy to
implement and provides path diversity. Combined with
fake packet injection, LPR is able to minimize the
traffic direction information that an adversary can
retrieve from eavesdropping. However, LPR provides
a kind of security routing guarantee but not datalevel privacy protection. Similar to Ref. [18], Ref. [19]
introduces a novel attack to locate source nodes in
WSNs, called Hotspot-Locating, which uses a realistic
adversary model. It also proposes a source location
privacy-preserving scheme that creates a cloud of fake
packets around the source node, varies traffic routes,
and changes the packets appearance at each hop.
Reference [2] introduces a data-level location privacy
problem, for example, the Privacy-Preserving Hopdistance Computation (PPHC) problem, and a protocol
based on data disguise techniques is proposed, whose
advantage is that it does not require a trusted third-party
or encryption operations, and thus generally has much
better performance than traditional solutions.

6

Conclusion

This paper puts forward a secure two-party distance
calculation protocol, HEEDP, based on privacy
homomorphism and the PPSPP scalar product
protocol. Owing to the satisfactory security and
remarkable performance on communication and
computation complexity and data types, HEEDP can
be considered a comprehensive protocol, suitable for
networks requiring high security and load balancing
of communications or calculations, such as wireless
sensor networks. The protocol is implemented based
on a semi-honest model, for instance, if malicious
attackers capture some sensor nodes, and deliberately
terminate the execution of protocols or provide fake
data for calculations, two participants cannot obtain true
results. Some current research work has already begun
for dealing with a completely malicious model[20] ,
which is the focus of our coming work.
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